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A B S T R A C TThe National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE)
recently recommended differential discounting of costs and health
effects in the economic appraisal of health care interventions in
certain circumstances. The recommendation was published in an
amendment to NICE’s Guide to the Methods of Technology Appraisal.
The amendment states that differential discounting should be applied
where ‘‘treatment effects are both substantial in restoring health and
sustained over a very long period (normally at least 30 years).’’
Renewed interest in differential discounting from NICE is welcome;
however, the recommendation’s selective application of differential
discounting raises a number of concerns. The stated criteria for
applying differential discounting are ambiguous. The rationale for
the selective application of differential discounting has not been
articulated by NICE and is questionable. The selective application of
differential discounting leads to several inconsistencies, the mostsee front matter Copyright & 2014, International
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ndence to: James O’Mahony, Department of Healthconcerning of which is the lower valuation of health gains for those
with less than 30 years remaining life expectancy, which can be
interpreted as age discrimination. Furthermore, the discount rates
chosen by NICE do not appear to be informed by recent advances in
the theoretical understanding of differential discounting. NICE’s
apparent motivation for recommending differential discounting was
to ensure a favorable cost-effectiveness ratio for a pediatric oncology
drug. While flexibility may be appropriate to allow some interventions
that exceed conventional cost-effectiveness thresholds to be adopted,
the selective adjustment of appraisal methods is problematic and
without justification.
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In July 2011, the National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence (NICE) published an amendment to its methods
guidance for the economic evaluation of health technologies
regarding the discounting of costs and health effects [1]. Since
2004, NICE has recommended equal discounting of costs and
health effects at a rate of 3.5% per annum. The recent amend-
ment, however, states that costs and health effects should now
be differentially discounted at 3.5% and 1.5% per annum, respec-
tively, in specific cases in which ‘‘treatment effects are both
substantial in restoring health and sustained over a very long
period (normally at least 30 years).’’ Such differential discounting
will generally result in the health technology in question having a
more favorable cost-effectiveness estimate than under equal
discounting, in turn strengthening the case for its adoption.
The amendment was made following a NICE appraisal com-
mittee’s consideration of mifamurtide, a drug indicated for
osteosarcoma, a rare disease that principally afflicts childrenand young adults. An article published on NICE’s Web site
explained the appraisal committee’s deliberation over the drug’s
cost-effectiveness and the decision to apply differential discount-
ing [2]. The article notes that under NICE’s standard 3.5% discount
rate, mifamurtide’s incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER)
was estimated to be d57,000 per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY),
which is considerably higher than NICE’s usual threshold range of
d20,000 to d30,000 per QALY. The appraisal committee noted that
applying differential discounting, at 3.5% and 1.5% per annum for
costs and health effects, respectively, reduced the estimated ICER
to a more favorable d36,000 per QALY. While this ICER remains
above the threshold range, it is broadly similar to those of other
interventions approved by NICE given special considerations such
as disease severity and childhood disease [3], and the NICE
appraisal committee recommended the adoption of mifamurtide.
In this article, we do not wish to address the merits of
recommending mifamurtide. We understand and respect the
appraisal committee’s decision. Nevertheless, the role of NICE’s
selective application of differential discounting in the adoptionSociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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guidance are concerning and deserve comment.
We describe how NICE’s decision to recommend the selective use
of differential discounting raises a number of methodological
difficulties and inconsistencies. The language of NICE’s amendment
is also ambiguous, raising further difficulties of interpretation. These
ambiguities, difficulties, and inconsistencies potentially undermine
the scientific rigor of NICE’s economic evaluation process.Ambiguities and Inconsistencies
Sensitivity Analysis or References Case?
The first ambiguity is whether the differential rates of 3.5% and
1.5% are the ‘‘reference case’’ rates for the special cases according
to the given criteria, or whether they are required only as part of
a sensitivity analysis. The amendment notes that the existing
NICE guidance recommends conducting a sensitivity analysis
with rates between 0% and 6%, including differential discounting.
The amendment states that if a sensitivity analysis is under-
taken, then rates of 3.5% and 1.5% should be applied rather than
the standard reference case rate of 3.5% equal discounting. The
juxtaposition with the standard rate of 3.5% strongly implies that
the 3.5% and 1.5% rates are the reference case rates for the
special cases. Furthermore, the NICE commentary on the use of
differential discounting in the appraisal of mifamurtide also
supports this interpretation. The reference to sensitivity analysis,
however, makes it unclear whether this interpretation is correct.
Eligibility for Differential Discounting
A further ambiguity regards which cases are eligible for differ-
ential discounting. The guidance recommends differential dis-
counting where health gains are ‘‘sustained.’’ What is meant by
sustained is not clear. It could preclude interventions that yield a
long-term health gain, but only with the maintained course of an
intervention rather than one-off treatment, such as HIV antire-
troviral therapy. The amendment also states that the interven-
tion must be ‘‘substantial in restoring health.’’ Presumably this
restorative criterion is intended to preclude preventative inter-
ventions. It is unclear, however, whether this requires patients to
have first suffered a health decrement before the intervention
alleviates this burden, or whether it is sufficient for the inter-
vention to halt disease progression from a healthy state to a
lower health state. The former would seem a strict interpretation
of restoring health, while the latter would seem to apply to
mifamurtide. Finally, it is also unclear how great the health
effects need to be to qualify as ‘‘substantial.’’ For example, there
could be differences in the interpretation of substantial regarding
relative or absolute improvements in health and whether gains
need to be substantial at the individual or population level.
Inconsistencies Resulting from the Eligibility Criteria
NICE’s recommendation that differential discounting be selec-
tively applied in some cases but not in others gives rise to
apparent inconsistencies, whereby interventions with similar
characteristics are subject to different discounting assumptions,
potentially leading to large differences in cost-effectiveness. Four
apparent inconsistencies are as follows:1. If we assume that the restorative criterion precludes preventa-
tive care, then we can consider two strategies to control the
same disease, one preventative and one curative, such as
vaccination against the human papillomavirus and treatment
for cervical cancer. Assuming that both interventions satisfy
the amendment’s other criteria, then, although they potentiallyachieve the same outcome, their effects will be discounted
differently. In this case, vaccination would be disadvantaged
relative to treatment in terms of cost-effectiveness.2. Similarly, if the criterion of sustained health gain precludes
interventions that require maintained therapy rather than a
one-off intervention, then a maintained intervention such as
antiretroviral therapy will be subject to equal discounting,
while a drug such as mifamurtide enjoys the benefit of
differential discounting.3. Consider two interventions that yield the same aggregate QALY
gain, one achieving this by bringing about a small QALY gain per
individual in a large patient population, while another achieves
a large QALY gain per individual in a small patient population. If
the substantial criterion precludes the application of differential
discounting in interventions with small health gains per
patient, then despite having similar aggregate QALY gains, the
two interventions may be subject to different discount rates.4. Finally, consider two interventions, the first yielding benefits
for 29 years, the second yielding identical benefits for 29 years
and an additional benefit in the 30th year (and so only the
second satisfies the ‘‘sustained’’ criterion). Assume that both
meet the amendment’s other criteria. Despite the fact that
both interventions produce the same benefit for 29 of the 30
years, the second will qualify for differential discounting,
while the first will not. This means that the initial 29 years
of identical benefits will be valued differently by NICE’s new
discounting scheme, simply because the second intervention
achieved one more year of benefits.
Discrimination on the Basis of Life Expectancy
The criterion that health gains must be sustained for 30 years or
more creates scope for arbitrary discrimination solely on the basis
of life expectancy. It means that an intervention for an individual
with a remaining life expectancy of 30 years could be eligible for
differential discounting, whereas an intervention for an individ-
ual with marginally less remaining life expectancy would be
subject to less favorable equal discounting. Consequently, there
could be a large difference in the intervention’s cost-effectiveness
estimates between these two similar individuals, potentially
leaving one individual eligible for treatment, but not the other.
Such arbitrary discrimination against those with shorter life
expectancy is unjustified. Furthermore, because individuals with
shorter life expectancy are often (but not always) older than those
with longer life expectancy, the revised discounting guidance
potentially exposes NICE to accusations of ageism.
NICE has previously been accused of both ageism and dis-
crimination against those with short life expectancy, most
notably by Harris [4]. This criticism, however, has been countered
by pointing out that NICE does not value health gains in older
patients or those with short life expectancy less than equivalent
health gains in other patients [5]. Unfortunately, with NICE’s
selective application of differential discounting, this defense may
no longer stand in all cases.Theoretical Issues and the Choice of Discount Rates
NICE’s amendment is also problematic regarding the discount
rates it recommends. While differential discounting at rates of
3.5% and 1.5% for costs and health effects has been recom-
mended by the Department of Health since 2004 [6], the amend-
ment makes no reference to this guidance. Similarly, the
amendment makes no reference to recent theoretical work on
the appropriate discount rates. Claxton et al. [7] demonstrate that
the appropriate differential between the discount rate on costs
and effects depends on whether or not the health care budget is
fixed. They show that in the case of a nonfixed budget, the
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growth rate of the societal value of health. In the case of a fixed
budget, the differential between the discount rates on costs and
effects is not determined by growth in the societal value of health
but should approximate the real annual growth rate of the cost-
effectiveness threshold, with positive threshold growth corre-
sponding to a lower discount rate for effects.
The existing NICE guidelines on the economic appraisal of
health care interventions explicitly state that the National Health
Service budget is assumed to be fixed [8], which implies that a
lower discount rate for health effects should be justified by
evidence of an increasing threshold. NICE’s stated cost-
effectiveness threshold range, however, has remained constant
in nominal terms over recent years, implying a real-terms
decrease [9]. Consequently, it is difficult to see how the 2%
differential used by NICE is justified. Furthermore, Paulden and
Claxton [10] show that under the perspective ostensibly adopted
by NICE, the discount rate on costs should approximate the real
rate of return on government bonds. The real rate of return on UK
government bonds is currently far below the 3.5% used by NICE
and has been for some time. Indeed, there is a notable irony that
if NICE had considered this recent theoretical work and set the
discount rate for costs and health effects equal to current real
government bond yields, then mifamurtide might have been
found to be cost-effective and there would have been no need
to adopt theoretically unjustified differential discounting.Absence of Rationale and NICE’s Citizen’s Council
Deliberation of Differential Discounting
An overarching problem with the amendment is the lack of a
plausible rationale for the selective application of differential
discounting. The amendment gives no justification for the eligi-
bility criteria it sets, and there is no obvious reason why they
should apply. While NICE gives no rationale for selective differ-
ential discounting, some insight is offered by a recent consulta-
tion of NICE’s Citizen’s Council of lay people. In November 2011,
NICE asked its Citizen’s Council to consider the issue of discount-
ing. A final report of this consultation was published in August
2012 [11].
As part of the consultation, NICE asked the council to consider
differential discounting in the context of a hypothetical example
of a highly effective (curative in most cases), but very costly
orphan drug used to control a childhood disease that is usually
fatal if unchecked. The ICER of the hypothetical drug under 3.5%
equal discounting was given as d57,000/QALY compared with
d24,000/QALY under differential discounting at 3.5% and 1.5%.
This example clearly and apparently deliberately resembles mifa-
murtide. The Citizen’s Council expressed concern regarding the
implications of discounting at a common rate of 3.5% per annum
for the drug’s cost-effectiveness. The council agreed that differ-
ential discounting should be applied in cases of highly effective or
curative interventions, interventions with health effects over a
long period of time, and (less unanimously) interventions for
children. A majority of the council members also said that they
would recommend adopting the hypothetical drug.
Despite the Citizen’s Council apparent approval of differential
discounting in the mifamurtide-like example, it is doubtful
whether this lends credibility to NICE’s selective application of
differential discounting. The example presented to the Citizen’s
Council conflates discounting with the issues of curative care,
childhood disease, and disease severity and rarity. Empirical
evidence indicates that people have a stronger preference for
health gains in children over adults, for health gains in those
with severe illnesses over less serious conditions, and for treat-
ment over prevention [12,13]. While there is no empiricalevidence of individuals having stronger preferences for treating
rare diseases, there is an apparent degree of policy support for
treating rare diseases preferentially, as evidenced by financial
incentives for research on such conditions in the United States
and the European Union [14]. Consequently, the Citizen’s Council
approval of differential discounting in the mifamurtide-like
example may simply be an expression of a greater willingness
to adopt such an intervention, rather than an endorsement of
selective differential discounting per se.Moving Forwards
While NICE’s selective adoption of differential discounting is an
easy target for criticism, we do have sympathy with those tasked
with deciding whether or not to approve mifamurtide. Rejecting
mifamurtide would likely prompt strong criticism of NICE by the
popular press. Faced with public pressure and an apparent
societal preference to prioritize curative care for severe, rare
diseases in children, a degree of flexibility in this case was not
unwise. However, we feel that such flexibility should be exercised
in a transparent and scientifically rigorous manner. If NICE
wishes to incorporate concern for particular patients or diseases
into its cost-effectiveness analyses, then this should be done so
explicitly through means such as adopting a higher cost-
effectiveness threshold or QALY weights in clearly defined eligi-
ble cases. This approach already has precedence with NICE’s
consideration of ‘‘end-of-life care’’ and in other decisions where
interventions with ICERs over the threshold range have been
recommended for adoption for explicit reasons, such as disease
severity, childhood illness, and significant innovation [3,15].
Similarly, the National Health Service in England has made
special provision for oncology treatments with ICERs above the
current threshold with the 2011-2014 Cancer Drugs Fund [16].
While we share previously articulated concerns regarding ring-
fenced funding [17], it may have been more appropriate to use the
Cancer Drugs Fund to accommodate mifamurtide than to arbi-
trarily adjust the discount rates.
In summary, NICE’s recently revised discounting guidance
gives rise to numerous ambiguities, difficulties, and inconsisten-
cies, which have the potential to undermine the scientific rigor of
NICE’s economic evaluation process. In particular, NICE’s amend-
ment creates scope for arbitrary discrimination on the basis of
life expectancy. Furthermore, the discount rates chosen are not
supported by our current understanding of differential discount-
ing. The choice of discount rates for quantitative analyses of
public policy will always provoke debate, as evidenced by the
controversy surrounding the discounting methodology adopted
in the Stern review of the economic consequences of climate
change [18–20]. Although flexibility in decision making is neces-
sary, achieving such flexibility with an apparently ad-hoc and
theoretically unjustified change to methods guidance is impru-
dent. We hope that NICE will consider these issues and refer to
the body of theoretical research on discounting when revising its
discounting methodology in the future.
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